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Policy makers sought to achieve exchange rate stability, monetary policy freedom to achieve 
domestic goals and maintain a regime of free international capital mobility.  (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, 
and Taylor, 2004). But reaching all three at the same time is regarded academically as impossible 
and self-contradictory. At most policymakers can be mutually consistent and choose to pursue two 
out of the three objectives. After the collapse of Bretton Woods agreement, most countries 
converged in pursuance of the first and third objective.  
 
Some European countries went even further and established Euro as common currency with a 
supranational monetary authority that leaves no room for independent adjustment of monetary 
policy with regard to domestic economics goals. If European countries, with all their economic 
might and long history of monetary policies, are still prone to crisis1, then it should not be 
surprising that other regions score lower on the stability front. Asian crisis in 1997 has been a major 
surprise since East Asia was the fastest growing region in the world at the time; even IMF praised 
the economic performance of the region shortly before the crisis. The economic contraction caused 
by the crises in the region proved to be very significant. Indonesia experienced the largest 
peacetime contraction in the world since 1960 (Fuman and Stiglitz, 1998). 
 
Asian economic crisis questioned the virtue of free international capital mobility (Krugman 1999, 
Stiglitz 2002), and cast doubts on the link between financial openness and the probability of a crisis 
(Edwards, 2005). The impact of a sudden stop of capital inflows and massive capital outflows on a 
country’s output and on the exchange rate could be devastating, especially after a period of regular 
capital inflows. As we write now, some affected countries have only recently regained their pre-
crisis levels of output. 
 
In this paper we address three main issues. How herd behaviour among investor exacerbated the 
crisis. How can capital control help? How to implement capital control without reducing 
international confidence? Banarjee (1992) developed a model of herd behaviour which results in 
inefficient outcome. We put this model in a setting of financial crisis and we introduce the 
possibility for a country to set up capital controls. We find that capital controls can reduce the 
effects of financial crisis and help stabilize the macroeconomic situation of the region, switching the 
outcome toward an efficient one. We propose a specific kind of ad hoc capital control similar to a 
the trading suspension in the stock market with a role for the IMF.  
 
This paper is organized with the following structure in mind. Section II provides a brief summary 
and chronology of the Asian crisis. Section III contains a literature review on currency crisis and 
Section IV develops a game theoretic analysis to study capital controls. We put forward our 
proposal in Section V and Section VI concludes the analysis.  
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 For instance, think of speculative attacks against Pound Sterling and Italian Lira in 1992. 
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The World Bank published “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy” in 
1993, joining the choir of praise to East Asian economies. The book, mainly funded by Japanese 
government, lavishly praised the East Asian governments’ role in economics. The most cited causes 
of the so called economic miracle were high percentage of exports, high savings rates, high quality 
of the human capital and efficient governments, as well as close business-government collaboration 
(World Bank 1993, Ito 2001). The same factors after the crisis were cited as the reasons of a high 
external dependence, of the inefficiency in capital allocation and hindering free market as well as 
crony capitalism. 
 
It’s impossible to deny the vast economic improvement, along with the decrease in inequality that 
accompanied growth in the region. During a thirty years period until 1996, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand sustained 4-5 percent growth per annum while South Korea experienced a 7.4 percent per 
annum with only one year of negative growth. The poverty rates in East Asia decreased from 60 % 
in 1975 to about 20 % in 1995 (Fuman & Stiglitz 1998). In relative terms, average incomes in the 
above countries were 10 percent of US average in 1965 but rose to 27 percent in 1995. The last 
miracle of post war Japan is less impressive in comparison. 
 
The stories of economic crises usually follow a similar path. An economy that had been receiving 
large amount of investments and capital inflows for considerable period and expect to do so in the 
future, abruptly had to face loan repayment under adverse conditions that lead to a default (or to a 
nearly default) on its loans. Add large drop exchange rate (think of many of Latin American crises) 
and a rapid contagion to get a time worn recipe for crises (Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1996) 
demonstrated that a currency crisis in an industrialized country can spread to the others). The root 
of the crisis in Asia could be traced back to financial liberation in the early 90’s that left the banking 
sector of those countries with numerous loan and deposit institutions, a lot of them small and 
unprofessionally managed, exposed to foreign loans without hedging.  The cosy relationships with 
governments together with expectation of bail out in times of trouble didn’t help them prepare when 
the crisis arrived.  
 
All the countries affected by the Asian Crisis (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and 
Thailand) received clean bill of health with praise from IMF just a couple of months before the 
crisis started to develop, and even after its start2. Therefore we will proceed by assuming those 
countries at least lying in the middle, if not on the strong side, in terms of the quality of their 
fundamentals. A lack of transparency, crony capitalism and weak financial institutions have 
characterized to some extent those countries, but pointing to those aspects as the main causes of the 
crisis would prevent to explain thoroughly why economic expansion that preceded the crisis could 
occur in the first place.  
 
After the Asian crisis there has been numerous studies on East Asia. A number of economists 
quickly pointed out the fault of the East Asian model and cited the crisis as the proof (see for 
example Yusuf, 2001), failing to explain the reasons of the previous growth miracle. We’ve chosen 
to follow Radelet and Sachs (1998) to describe what happened: they divide the time period into 
three sub-periods. The build-up to the crisis took place from 1990-1997, when the short term 
external debt was rapidly increasing due to the East Asian shining economic performance with 
stellar exports growth. This event caused appreciation of the exchange rates and expansion of bank 
lending that hided a growing weakness in the banking system. Some of the lending was used to 
                                                
2
 In Hong Kong in September 1996 at an IMF and WB meeting (Stiglitz, 2002) 
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prop and speculate on the real estate sector which led to property boom and pulled even more bank 
lending to properties with inflated price. Second, in early 1997 three FKDHERO in South Korea 
announced bankruptcies with billion of dollars in debt; at the same time, in Thailand, the property 
bubble started to burst and resulted in drop of property prices. Both cases led to difficulties in the 
banking sector (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, consider as “twins” banking crisis and financial 
ones) and Thai currency started experiencing speculative attacks since late 1996. Thai government 
renegade on promise to bail out close to 4 billion dollars of bad property debt that lead to more 
speculations on possible floatation of baht, which Thai government denied, due to draining of 
currency reserves. Baht was float on July 2 and capital outflow, from all the Asian countries, 
followed immediately. Exchange rate fell, loans were not extended and credit ratings were 
downgraded. 
 
The initial response to the crises is the third stage of time line. By trying too hard to maintain 
exchange rate, Thai government lost massive amounts of reserves. Thus, they remained with fewer 
foreign exchange reserves with respect to outstanding debts to international banks, together with 
financial sectors still in disarray. Other governments in the regions also did their part in 
undermining their own credibility; Malaysia renegade on its plan to establish funds to support stock 
prices while Indonesia retracted plan to postponed hundreds of major investment programs. Worse, 
state enterprise was ordered to pull out deposit from banking system. Korea used up her reserves to 
maintain won value after letting the FKDHERO going through bankrupts. IMF offered standard 
structural adjustment program with high interest rates, low growth of money supply and closing 
insolvent banks. The entire original program were discarded within months and left investors even 
more eager to pull out their money.  
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Krugman (1979) provided the main foundation crisis when the central bank faced rapid depletion of 
foreign currency reserves due speculative attack noticing weak economic fundamentals. Obstfeld 
(1986) altered the model and showed that the attach could still occur despite sufficiently strong 
econonomic fundamentals, thus turn the speculative attack into a self-fulfilling acts. Credibility of 
monetary authority become important since independent speculator would not start speculating, thus 
start the self-fulfilling crisis, if they perceive strong intent, consistency and capability (Obstfeld 
1991, 1994; Isard 1995).  
 
Models (Cole and Kehoe 1996; Obstfeld 1996; Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 1996) have been 
developed where a country with good fundamentals won’ t definitely suffer a crisis where a country 
with bad fundamentals will definitely suffer a crisis, but for countries in the middle the expectations 
of speculators will be self fulfilling. 
 
Fuman & Stiglitz (1998) investigate three possible causes of a financial crisis. First, it is possible 
that the East Asian economic policies, that served them so well in early stages of development, were 
no longer suitable in a more prosperous situation. Second, the countries involved have abandoned 
the behaviours that have brought them prosperity. Third, the policy was no longer suited to a 
changing world. We investigate deeper the last possibility focusing on the recent large increase (3.3 
% of GDP on 1990 to 8.3 % of GP in 1996) in capital inflows, comprehending also short term 
capital/debt that could create enormous strains on economies. 
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Masson (1999) analyzed models that produced multiple equilibriums in financial markets instead of 
the standard single equilibrium models. When investors recognize possibility of switching to 
another equilibria, it introduces volatility that with higher impact than economic fundamentals. 
Multiple equilibria models acknowledge the low predictability of asset prices and authority’ s 
decision to devalue currency. Masson also proposed taxonomy for crises in developing countries 
with regard to its cause. The monsoonal effect, as its name suggests of a monsoon that affect all 
ships in the region, is an external shock (i.e. change in US monetary policy) that affects numerous 
developing countries. The spillovers effects come from macroeconomic linkages among developing 
countries such as trade flows. The pure contagion effects are those that are not related to 
macroeconomic fundamentals. With regard to contagion, Maig & Goldfajn (1999) found evidence 
for contagion between financial markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and the 
Philippines where correlation between currency and sovereign spread increase significantly during 
the Asian crisis.  
 
Rogoff (1999), chief economist of the IMF, proposes some modifications in the international 
institutions in order to reduce instability. He started by examining the problems with the status quo, 
proposing to take the developing country perspective into account, instead of just the American one. 
He defended the Washington Consensus of financial liberalization with argument from the 
theoretical side where it supposed to be beneficial, while conveniently failed to cite literature on the 
risk of financial liberalization to small economy and massive empirical findings that point out 
capital flow from capital-poor country to capital-rich country after liberalization.  
 
In a famous column, Paul Krugman (1998) proposed to temporarily sacrifice international capital 
mobility in order to benefit from a stable exchange rate and an independent monetary policy in the 
time of crisis. To Krugman’ s surprise, the government of Malaysia imposed capital controls a 
couple of weeks after the publication of his column. This measure received scores of criticism from 
the academia and international organizations, who forecast an economic slowdown and smaller 
future investments. But after a few years, Malaysian economy performed better than the other 
affected countries. Investments continue to arrive there, even though a recent study by Goh (2005) 
puts some shadows on that, showing that long term flows have yet reached again the pre-crisis 
levels. 
 
Banerjee (1992) developed a model of herd behaviour in sequential decision where each decision 
maker looks at the decisions made by previous decision makers that may have informational value 
in taking their own decision. The result is herd behaviour and inefficient equilibrium. Krugman 
(1999) elaborated the line of argument and applied it into a currency crisis setting with numerous 
independent investors. In a public good setting, it is well known that the large number of players 
will reduce the contributions of each while repeated interactions will increase it. Thus, it is not 
surprising to find numerous smart and rational investors from all around the world; with practically 
no physical interaction between them, took actions that benefit them if taken individually but 
caused harm when taken collectively.  
 
Stiglitz (2004) strongly criticize the move by US Treasury and IMF to push for capital account 
liberalization in the 1980s with disregard to alternate view that questions the tenacious link between 
liberalization and growth. He quoted Rogoff, former IMF chief economist, admission of how 
liberalization could cause stability with higher cost compare with benefit of liberalization. Tying the 
force measure across the board with the trade and aid issue could be seen as an ideological act 
instead of sound economic policy. 
 5 
,9/HW¶V*HW5DGLFDO 
 
We restate Banarjee’ s results in a setting of financial crisis and we introduce the possibility for a 
country to set up capital controls. Let us observe the simple game tree above with two 
investors/creditors. We assume that crisis is entirely exogenous, can not be precisely predicted and 
only known when it starts to unravel, and investors are risk averse toward volatility. Then the 
circumstances will resemble a symmetric prisoner dilemma below: 
 
 
 
Payoff to stay in the time of crisis when other also flight is the lowest, followed by flight when 
other also flight. The highest payoff is to flight when other stay follow by stay when other also stay 
(a > b > c > d). This is a common situation when action of one person affects the payoff of other as 
numerous occasions of bank run and stock exchange panics remind us. The logic of prisoner 
dilemma dictates in absence of communication3 and binding commitment both players will choose 
to take their money away from crisis affected countries. 
 
Let us extend the model where the government can choose to impose capital controls when crisis 
occurred. Payoff for investors/creditors is stated in the first line and the government’ s one in the 
second. No crisis naturally have the highest payoffs followed by capital control, assuming good 
timing and effective implementation4, compare to no capital control (a > b > c and d > e > f). 
Building from previous game, in the time of a crisis, all investors want to flight but capital control 
will serve as a coordination mechanism to stay, thus make them better off.  
 
 
                                                
3
 We think this is a credible assumption since during a crisis there is hardly time for thousands of investors to sit down 
and discuss common exit strategies.  
4
 Here we abstract from implementations problems that arise when governments try to impose controls on capital flows 
(in this case on outflows). There are also other issues that we don’ t develop here, such as the wide possible kinds of 
controls that a country can choose (see Magud and Reinhart, 2005, for a list of controls implemented in a bunch of 
countries in the last years), the many effects that controls can have apart from keeping capitals in the country, included 
the long term ones (see Goh, 2005). 
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If we group the countries in a region as those that will impose capital control in the time of crisis 
and those that will never impose it, investors can performed backward induction to choose which 
country to invest in the first place. To simplify matter we assume the two countries are identical and 
provide similar payoff. We also assume that payoff when there is no crisis is identical in both 
countries (b = d) and according to previous game the payoff in country that will impose capital 
control in time of crisis is higher compare to those who won’ t (a > c). Capital inflow will go to the 
former knowing they will gain more in the time of crisis.  
 
 
 
Now we extend further the analysis to take into account the contagion effect where investors take 
away their money not only from affected country but also from its neighbours. As seen in the next 
table with similar structure to table 1 (a > b > c > d), it will be a race to impose capital control in 
reverse to race to capital flight in table 1 since the payoff to impose capital control is higher when 
other also impose.  
 
 
 
We calculated Capital Flight as current-account balance with the sign reversed plus the change in 
international reserves, minus the change in total external debt stock (not adjusted for the effects of 
cross-currency valuation changes), minus net direct investment. The data show that Malaysia is the 
only country in the period that did not experience positive capital flight (apart from small positive 
values in 1995 and 2004). We believe that this provides support for our hypothesis about the 
payoffs of the game in Graph 1 (in particular a > c).  
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The idea of applying controls on capital flows is not free of problems and some assumptions need to 
be made for effective implementation. However, there are few doubts about the effectiveness of 
Malaysian controls5, even if Malaysian government received strong critics from all over the world. 
The country is going on applying some kind of controls, especially the ones on the currency. Today 
no speculations are possible on Ringgit and this is the strongest among the possible restrictions on 
the currency markets. 
  
We observe major adjustments between the US dollar and the Euro; on the other hand there are GH
IDFWR fixed exchange rates in some Asian countries such as China and Malaysia. Their currencies 
hardly float, while their official reserves are growing at incredible swift rates. Numerous 
economists claim that the Euro is suffering from a burden that comes from the actions taken by 
those Asian nations6. The need for a reform of the international financial architecture is discussed 
more and more. A prominent proposal of a super chapter XI made by Stiglitz (2002), opens the 
possibility of declaring international default in case of difficulties in payments. We would like to 
advance the idea of a reform of our own that, if successfully implemented, could have two kinds of 
advantages.  
 
We propose the application of trading suspension to currency market in case of speculations that 
bring excessively downward (or upward) the value of the currencies. Trading suspension is a widely 
accepted instrument in developed stock markets. In USA, for example, it has appeared since more 
than 70 years ago as Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In the event of 
emergency, defined as sudden and excessive fluctuations of securities prices generally, or a 
substantial threat against fair and orderly markets, the Security & Exchange commission is 
authorized to suspend trading in any security for a period not exceeding 10 business days. The 
                                                
5
 Literature on capital controls suffers from various shortcomings; one is the high number of studies about Chile and 
Malaysia compared to few empirical evidences from all the other cases. Thanks to that we can state that there are few 
doubts on Malaysian case, while we must be careful when speaking of other countries. 
6
 See Maccario, Savona, Stroppa ad Zazzara (2006). 
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argument for trading suspension is to protect public interest and private investors when public 
information about a company (we’ re talking about stock and bond markets) is not current, accurate, 
or adequate. 
 
This could bring to an end the speculations in case of unjustified attacks (unjustified in the sense of 
no lack of fundamentals). As explained by Kryzanowski (1979) for the stock market, the suspension 
period could allow for more transparency, by making available new information. This new 
information (about the strength of fundamentals) can be favourable or unfavourable; with these new 
elements the operators of the market could decide to go further selling (or buying) the currency or 
to reverse their behaviour. The suspension period could also cool down the market frenzy and 
reduce incentive for herd behaviour. Our proposal would be less ‘free market averse’ , unlike actual 
Malaysian controls, and easier to realize than Stiglitz’ s7, since the latter would require legal 
adjustments in numerous countries and could encounter rejection due to infringement to national 
sovereignty.  
 
We admit that it’ s hard to precisely foresee the results of such suspensions, since it’ s impossible to 
assume that they would be equal to the ones obtained from the study of stock markets (for example 
Kryzanowski’ s: no rapid answer of the market to unfavourable information, rapid positive answer in 
case of favourable information).Thus, more study is needed in order to fix the percentage of change 
in the value of the currencies that could determine the trading suspension, and the extension of the 
period. To investigate the possible effects would require more research, such as simulations and 
modelling, in order not to wrongly impose stock markets conditions on currency markets. 
 
Our proposal also provides a new role for the IMF: it could act as the regulator of currency 
exchange, determining the standardized conditions where capital controls could be justified. The 
IMF has the authority and the expertise to define the criteria of application of this new (new for 
currency markets, although it’ s pretty old for stock markets) measure, leaving to the member 
countries the freedom of choice on implementation. Giving to the IMF the role of global SEC for 
currency market would reduce heterogeneity of regulations among countries and could provide 
stability for actors of that market. 
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The search for the root of crises led us to rediscover the importance of proper sequencing and 
timing of financial liberalization. East Asian has prospered with strength in real sector export, 
fuelled by human capital and government policy that was not accompanied by precautious financial 
sector.  
 
With the assistance of game theoretical framework, we analyzed herd behaviour of international 
investors in the time of financial crisis. Under free international capital mobility, uncertainty and 
lack of coordination among investors with short-horizon, we found prisoner dilemma type of 
arrangement that exacerbated financial crisis. We extended the model to analyze multiple countries 
under financial crisis and fear of contagion. We found that the ability to impose capital control, 
under certain conditions, will isolate the crisis and reduce contagion effect.  
 
Applying the analysis to a multi-stage game including the government, we found that a credible 
threat of capital control could reduce herd behaviour and help the country to escape the worst of 
                                                
7
 As stated by Eichengreen (1999), it’ s important to care about implementation problems when speaking about possible 
reforms of the international financial architecture.  
 9 
financial crisis. We proposed the employment of a trading suspension policy in place of free capital 
mobility, which is regularly requested by the IMF and the international community. Therefore, 
freedom to employ capital controls is a policy tool that enables the flight from the macroeconomic 
trilemma and enables policy makers to pursue all of the three goals at the same time. 
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